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Comments on the Current and Possible Future Role of the
International Trade Commission and the Canadian Import
Tribunal in the North American Competitive Context
by Jonathan T. Fried*
I t is very much a pleasure to be back in Cleveland, and each year that I
return I have a better appreciation of the city. I would like to be very
brief, so as to allow more time for discussion. I should state at the outset
that I'm speaking only in my personal capacity and that my views do not
necessarily represent those of Ambassador Reisman and the Government
of Canada.
Against that backdrop, I would like to offer you some musings on
dispute settlement and the role of the ITC and CIT- CIT of course, for
you Americans, is the Canadian Import Tribunal rather than the Court
of International Trade-in a free trade area in general terms. To those
more expert, I leave the development of the details.
I appreciate Commissioner Brunsdale's football analogy, though I'm
not sure I would describe the teams the same way. Working within the
government as part of the team that is seeking to negotiate a true free
trade arena, I would consider that the governments as a whole on both
sides, as ratified or mandated by our respective legislatures, are construc-
tion workers and engineers. We are building a stadium in which there
should be a level playing field. The kicker, the coach and the business-
men are the ones playing the game. We are seeking only to create the
most advantageous conditions for conducting business.
Now I would like to restate what many of you have heard so many
times before; that is, what is at issue in the trade negotiations? What are
we seeking to do for business in constructing this Free Trade arena?
First and foremost, by entering into these negotiations, both govern-
ments have committed themselves to seeking to insure an environment
that provides secure and predictable market access to business on both
sides of the border. Carl Beigie talked a bit as to why, in economic
terms, that is a desirable goal. In my view, very simply, secure and
predictable access has the effect of encouraging producers and investors
to take full advantage of a larger market by virtue of the removal of
barriers to trade. That should generate economic growth. In order to
achieve this result, a more open, larger market for business is needed.
Second, both governments wish to impose appropriate disciplines on
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themselves and on each other in the use of trade distorting government
practices, as well as private party pricing practices that may have the
effect of distorting trade. One wants to avoid trade distortion in further-
ance of an overall objective to provide that larger market of fairer trade.
Third, if one wants to impose that discipline in furtherance of
broader market access, one would do so in a manner that would avoid
procedural harassment of legitimate commerce. If we have done our job
in defining articulately what is fair and what is trade distorting, then the
procedures around which those substantive standards are to be enforced
should not cause further uncertainty or harassment.
Fourth, in connection with this avoidance of procedural harassment,
one would want to insure that responses to these trade distorting prac-
tices-by way of government assistance or by way of private pricing or
other market restrictive practices- provide effective and timely correc-
tive action. The action should take place in a manner that not only de-
termines the case at hand, but provides conditioning or deterrent effect,
and provides guidance to businesses in their future and forward plans.
Fifth, one would hope that responses to trade distortions would take
account of the North American market conditions in that regard. In
many cases the issue is not and should not properly be viewed as is there
a subsidy or is there an injury, but rather what is the North American
market situation? Are we over capacity? Is there an adjustment prob-
lem? What are the downstream effects of restricting or keeping open bi-
lateral trade in the specific product under consideration? One would
hope that in responding to considerations of distorting practices, one
would design solutions in a manner that takes a comprehensive view of
the overall market situation.
Sixth, both the substantive disciplines imposed and the procedural
responses that insure enforcement of those disciplines should be consis-
tent with a free trade area. Article 24 of the GATT requires both Can-
ada and the United States to reduce or eliminate, insofar as possible,
those measures that have the effect of constituting a restrictive regulation
of commerce. That's the language of the GAIT. A restrictive regulation
of commerce is a regulation that has the effect of constituting a border
barrier to trade. So guided by the objective of pursuing an article 24 free
trade area, it seems to me that Canada and the United States, in design-
ing both their disciplines and their responses to conduct that does not
comply with these disciplines, should do so in a manner that does not
promote but rather reduces or eliminates border measures.
Finally, I think we should all keep in mind that, as the Prime Minis-
ter has stated publically and in the House of Commons, without signifi-
cant progress on contingency protection, there will not be an agreement.
So with that in mind, can we set out some general objectives or factors
that may be relevant in considering the role of the ITC and the Canadian
Import Tribunal or alternative procedures to respond to trade distorting
practices?
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I think first it has to be emphasized that one can't talk about proce-
dures to respond to distorting practices until one knows what the sub-
stantive principles are going to be. Any procedures, domestic or
binational, must be responsive to the substantive rules of the Free Trade
Agreement itself; and as I stated at the outset, both governments started
and are pursuing these negotiations with the shared objective of develop-
ing an agreed discipline that defines the terms and conditions of bilateral
trade.
These principles that are to be reflected in a free trade agreement
will, of course, be implemented through changes to domestic law,
changes to domestic regulation, and changes to administrative practices
of governments. The changes will be implemented in order to provide
that environment of certainty which permits confident business planning
in a competitive environment. Once you have the implementation of
these rules on the books, your objectives are certainty and predictability
so as to afford business the opportunity to play an entire game according
to the rules with which they started playing the game. You want to in-
sure that in the administration of these rules of the treaty, the rules are
interpreted and applied domestically in a manner that maintains that cer-
tainty and predictability.
Even after they are implemented, the rules of the treaty may be
threatened by any one of a number of events. Government decisions by
middle-level bureaucrats, political decisions by legislative bodies, admin-
istrative action, or private practices may all threaten to undermine or
reinterpret the original intent of the parties. Only with the assurance
that the terms of bilateral trade will be protected against these future
threats can investors and exporters rely upon the originally developed
framework.
Next, the procedures and the institutions designed to protect the
disciplines undertaken by both governments should themselves promote
the objectives of the Free Trade Agreement. This includes, most impor-
tantly, respect for the significant structural changes that both govern-
ments expect to be made. Merely restoring a balance of concessions,
where a dispute settlement system or avenues for complaint premised
only on consultation and conciliation, such as that of the GATT, would
not protect the structural changes that we expect to be made, particularly
by Canadian industry.
Such a system would, as it currently does, leave the two govern-
ments free to take compensatory or retaliatory action on the basis of non-
binding recommendations to restore a balance of rights and obligations.
This would constitute authorization to erect new barriers to trade. Once
these new barriers are erected, whether temporarily or indefinitely, they
would effectively change the rules under which bilateral trade is con-
ducted. The barriers would thereby change the basis upon which busi-
ness will have undertaken a commitment to compete in a more fully
integrated North American market.
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Institutions and procedures in the Free Trade Area must avoid un-
ravelling the framework of the treaty and must condition the future con-
duct of governments and private parties. Where does that take us? Let
me offer you some general principles in terms of the manner in which the
disciplines regarding subsidies, pricing practices, and a range of other
substantive obligations- from intellectual property to services-might
be governed in a free trade agreement.
First, any dispute settlement regime, or any institutional arrange-
ment, be it the continuation of the ITC and CIT or a binational regime,
must properly be understood as flowing from the substantive rules of the
agreement. No dispute settlement regime can stand in isolation; rather
dispute settlement institutions and procedures must be responsive to the
kind and frequency of disputes that may arise concerning the obligations
undertaken by the two governments in the agreement itself.
Second, to the extent that the Free Trade Agreement is meant to
provide that stadium, in which business plays, the procedures and insti-
tutions must be comprehensive in terms of covering that which is sub-
stantively undertaken in the agreement. A single regime, possibly
tailored to the imperatives of factual determinations versus questions of
principle, should govern the interpretation and application of every as-
pect of the agreement, although modifying provisions may be required.
This tailoring of procedures to specific circumstances, however, should
not derogate from the overall framework.
Third, if the Free Trade Agreement is intended to be a comprehen-
sive code-a self-enclosed stadium-the dispute settlement procedures
and institutions should be exhaustive. In other words, for any dispute
derived from or concerning obligations under the agreement, only the
procedures set out in the Free Trade Agreement should be available. Re-
sort to other forums, such as the GATT, or to actions not bilaterally
agreed to, properly should be precluded.
Fourth, I can't overemphasize the importance that should be prop-
erly attached to dispute avoidance. The ultimate goal of any institutional
arrangement and dispute settlement regime is to prevent disputes from
arising. Courts, jurisprudence, and quasi-judicial and administrative
agencies-to the extent that they are able to be public in their proceed-
ings-may provide their most beneficial impact in avoiding future litiga-
tion or contentious proceedings. Any channels for complaint, any
channels for consideration of the extent to which the substantive obliga-
tions of the Free Trade Agreement are being respected by the two gov-
ernments in terms of possible subsidization or trade distorting practices,
should try to avoid letting disputes arise or grow. To that extent, the
response should initially be as pragmatic and as comprehensive as possi-
ble in order to take account of the broader impact of these trade dis-
torting practices, market conditions, adjustment factors, downstream
effects, and so on.
Fifth, procedures for notification, consultation, and amicable concil-
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iation, which all flow from the notion of dispute avoidance, must be pro-
vided. In the end result, there must be an avenue for the binding
settlement of disputes between Canada and the United States. Only
through binding decisions can the integrity of the stadium-of the treaty
framework-be preserved.
Last, it strikes me that Commissioner Brunsdale's call for greater
predictability and Commissioner Bertrand's call for clear definition or
description of differences in administration between the two tribunals re-
quire binational administration of the standards of the Free Trade Agree-
ment itself.
The assessments, whether they be injury, industry, or relevant mar-
ket, must be made properly on a North American basis. It strikes me
that the logical implication of what each of our two speakers has said is
that there is a need to look at these issues in a free trade area-of subsidi-
zation, of pricing, and of injury--on a North American basis. Binational
administration in a binding manner is required in case dispute avoidance
and amicable procedures fail to address these issues adequately in a man-
ner satisfactory to both governments and their industries. There are a
range of options that we can all think of as to how one achieves these
objectives.
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